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The relative merits of different systems of property rights to allocate water among
different extractive uses are evaluated for the case where variability of supply is
important. Three systems of property rights are considered. In the ﬁrst, variable
supply is dealt with through the use of water entitlements deﬁned as shares of the total
quantity available. In the second, there are two types of water entitlements, one for
water with a high security of supply and the other a lower security right for the resid-
ual supply. The third is a system of entitlements speciﬁed as state-contingent claims.
With zero transaction costs, all systems are efﬁcient. In the realistic situation where trans-
action costs matter, the system based on state-contingent claims is globally optimal,
and the system with high-security and lower security entitlements is preferable to the








Australian governments, as well as economists, see market trading of secure,
transparent and enforceable water rights as a key mechanism for improving
the allocation of scarce water between different households, industrial ﬁrms,
and irrigators (Council of Australian Governments 1994, 2003; Victorian
Government 2003, 2004). Already much progress has been made in developing
markets to reallocate water between different irrigation uses, particularly for




. 2000; Victorian Government
2004). Water and land rights have been (mostly) unbundled. Water leases have
been converted into tradeable rights, and these rights are more precisely and
explicitly speciﬁed than in the past. Charges for water delivery are based on costs.
The deﬁnition of systems of property rights for water that will facilitate
permanent as well as temporary trades, trades across regions, and trades across
broad user groups is a complex and difﬁcult task. One of the most important
difﬁculties stems from the extreme variability of rainfall in Australia and its
effects on the variability of available water for the different uses in any one
period and region. Water users have different levels of ﬂexibility in adjusting
year-to-year consumption in times of high and low water availability, and
different levels of tolerance for uncertainty about supply.
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Different strategies currently used to manage supply variability in specifying
property rights for water include: a single entitlement speciﬁed as a share of
available supplies, either of water released or of water in storage; multiple
entitlements with different levels of reliability; and priority rights (Productivity
Commission 2003). Young and McColl (2002, p. 29) suggest that a system of
priority rights is preferable because it will reduce transactions costs. (Here,
and throughout, we use the term ‘entitlement’ to refer to a long-term right to
receive an allocation of water, where the allocation received in any year may
be contingent on the aggregate availability of water. An entitlement is therefore
part of a system of property rights for water.)
A model of state-contingent claims (for example, Chambers and Quiggin
2000) offers a rigorous way of analysing the relative merits of the different
options. In this paper, three systems of property rights for water are compared.
In the ﬁrst, variable supply is dealt with through the use of water entitlements
deﬁned as shares of the total quantity available. In the second, there are two
types of water entitlements, one for water with a high security of supply and
the other a low-security right for the residual supply. The third is a system of
entitlements speciﬁed as state-contingent claims.
With zero transaction costs, all systems are efﬁcient. In a realistic model of
the world there are transaction costs in the transfer of entitlements to water
and in trade between holders of entitlements under conditions where the water
allocation associated with a given entitlement is variable. These costs act as
barriers to efﬁciency-improving trades. In this paper, the transaction costs
associated with alternative systems of property rights are compared.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out some of the broad
issues associated with the allocation of scarce water. Within this general context,
a framework for evaluating the different systems of water property rights to
accommodate the variability of supplies is presented. The different systems of
water property rights are described and their relative attributes are compared
and contrasted in Section 3. This comparison is ﬁrst described informally,
using a simple graphical model, and then formally, using the tools of ﬁnance
theory. Section 4 explains how the model of Section 3 can readily be expanded in
more realistic ways. Section 5 provides a model to determine the efﬁcient mix
of high-security and lower-security water property entitlements within a system
of water property rights based on multiple entitlements with different levels of
reliability. Some further institutional issues associated with externalities,
water delivery, environmental ﬂows, and the initial allocation of entitlements are
discussed in Section 6. Some concluding comments are presented in Section 7.
 
2.  Property rights for water markets
 
The operations of markets to allocate scarce water in a world of variable
supplies (and other changes) requires a system of property rights that captures
the social beneﬁts and costs of the alternative uses of water from a reservoir
(aquifer or other source). There are at least three important components of social 
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costs for a particular use of water: the opportunity cost of alternative uses of
the water at source; costs of treatment and delivery to point of use; and external
costs associated with the particular water use. Each of these costs has distinctive
characteristics, including geographical location, the form and extent of market
failure, and the time period over which costs are incurred.
Differences in geographical location are relevant because most stored water in
Australia is some distance from its ﬁnal use, and in many cases, including for
human consumption, water treatment also is required. The distribution and
treatment infrastructure is characterised by large and lumpy investments that
are location speciﬁc, and once committed become sunk costs.
The time at which water is delivered and used is also relevant. In some cases,
and particularly at times of peak demand, capacity constraints and the need for
rationing limited capacity through scarcity rents can be encountered. Effective
property rights for water delivery will need to reﬂect capacity constraints and
might be speciﬁed for relatively short time intervals (perhaps as short as a day).
In many cases, the use of water involves external costs. In particular, the
use of water for irrigation may result in rising water tables, causing salinity and other
problems. One option to deal with these problems in the speciﬁcation of property
rights is to require water users to have a usage licence or use right that includes
an externality correction measure. Clearly, details of the use right would vary with
the water use, location, and so forth, and sometimes the differences in detail and
their implied costs will vary widely to reﬂect the variation of external costs.
Rights to water may be partitioned into water ownership rights, distribution
rights, and use rights. To simplify, we take as given an appropriate system of
delivery rights and use rights, and focus on the speciﬁcation of water owner-
ship rights at the source or at the dam wall. In particular, we explore options
for specifying these water rights in the context where water supplies vary
because of seasonal conditions from year to year.
As a ﬁnal introductory point, the paper draws a distinction between an
entitlement to water and an allocation of water. An entitlement refers to a long-
term or perpetual life property right. An allocation refers to water made available
for use over a short interval of time. Permanent water sales refer to the transfer
of entitlements and temporary water sales refer to the transfer of an allocation for
a particular period. These terms closely relate to the system of corporate capital
property rights with the share being the entitlement and the dividend being the
allocation. Then, just as the value of the share, an asset, equals the discounted
value of the expected stream of future dividend ﬂows, the value of an entitlement,
again an asset, equals the discounted expected value of future water allocations.
 
3. Model
3.1  Basic model
 
A simple model can be used to compare two systems of water property
rights: one with a single entitlement to a share of total available water; and a 
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second that has a high-security entitlement and a lower security entitlement
for residual water. In New South Wales, the two entitlements in the second
system are referred to as high-security and general security rights, and in
Victoria they are referred to as water rights and sales water.
Figure 1 illustrates the operation of an efﬁcient system of water allocation.
There are two sets of water demand: low-ﬂexibility uses with a relatively low




, shown in Figure 1a; and high-





shown in Figure 1b. Low-ﬂexibility uses include for household indoor use,
industry, and perennial crops. High-ﬂexibility uses include gardens and
annual crops. These demands are net of delivery costs and any external costs.
















































From Figure 1c we can identify market outcomes that result in an efﬁcient
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, and   is allocated to low-ﬂexibility uses and   to high-













 to ration the reduced supply. The absolute volume allocated to
each use falls, and more importantly the relative share of water allocated to
more ﬂexible uses falls. In Figure 1c as drawn, the high-ﬂexibility users would
purchase zero water in a dry year, and the low-ﬂexibility uses would be
allocated .
Consider now the two different sets of options for specifying property
rights, and initially assume a perfectly competitive market with no transac-
tions costs. With the ﬁrst option where water entitlements are speciﬁed as a
share of available ﬂows, suppose the rights are allocated to users on the basis
of historical average use (a type of ‘grandfather’ arrangement). Because of
competition, and assuming zero transaction costs, arbitrage would ensure a












 in dry years. We
can anticipate the need for extensive temporary trades of water, namely, pur-
chases by low-ﬂexibility users from high-ﬂexibility users in dry years, and
purchases by high-ﬂexibility users from low-ﬂexibility users in wet years.
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 are the water quantities received for












. The value of a water entitlement, or
of a permanent trade, is then the expected present value of the time series of






 in Equation (1).
Consider next the second water property rights model which has two
entitlements with different levels of supply reliability or security. The high-
security entitlement has ﬁrst priority over water allocated each year, and has an
almost complete guarantee of water delivery. The lower-security entitlement
is met only after the high-security entitlements have been satisﬁed. In the
context of Figure 1c, the high-security entitlement is for  , which is
met with probability one in both dry and wet years, and the lower-security










, which is met only in wet





Assuming, as before, a competitive market with zero transaction costs,













 for water in dry years. At these prices, the efﬁcient allocation of water
shown in Figure 1c for wet and for dry years will occur. The expected annual


















































































. Values for the high-security water entitlements and
the lower-security entitlements for permanent trades are the discounted sums












 in Equations (2) and (3).
Per unit of water received, the high-security entitlement is the most valuable,
then the water share security entitlement, and the least valuable is the lower-
security water entitlement.
Now, compare the property rights system based on a single share entitle-
ment with the system based on two priority entitlements (a high-security
entitlement and a lower-security entitlement). Suppose initially a world of
zero transaction costs. According to the Coase theorem (1960) and as asserted
by Young and McColl (2002), either property rights system will induce mutu-
ally beneﬁcial transfers of water allocations so that the efﬁcient distribution
and associated prices described by Figure 1 will be achieved.
Transaction costs include the costs of: obtaining information; ﬁnding
other traders; negotiating mutually beneﬁcial trades; effecting and registering
QQ dd
l    = 
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these trades; and enforcing contracts (Williamson 1996; Rao 2002). With the
current Watermove market for temporary trades of water in southern Australia,
sellers pay a 3 per cent commission, and buyers pay a 
 
#A55 ﬂat fee plus a
transfer fee of up to #A112 for each transaction (Watermove 2005). This
direct cost represents only part of the transaction costs.
The ability and right to use water also depends on the transfer of water
delivery rights and the acquisition of a water use right. In most cases these
rights involve additional transaction costs (ACIL Tasman 2003; Marsden
Jacob and Associates 1999). Because of the geographical dispersion and
potentially important disaggregated time dimensions of delivery rights, transaction
costs are likely to be signiﬁcant.
Further, there are a number of government-imposed restrictions on transfers
across regions that add to uncertainty for the individual and to transaction
costs. The acquisition of use rights for new uses or users currently is subject
to uncertain and often costly negotiation with authorities. In addition to the
measurable costs noted so far, uncertainty about policy together with uncer-
tainty in the minds of risk averse traders as to whether allocated water can be
purchased or sold on the spot market as required adds to transaction costs.
These costs rule out some mutually beneﬁcial trades, and imply that the
Coase theorem result will not, in general be applicable.
Transaction costs may become smaller once a well-deﬁned set of water
property rights is in place and the market has matured. However, in view of
the complexity of water rights, transactions costs are likely to remain important.
For the foreseeable future, transaction costs are unlikely to be low enough to
justify invoking the Coase theorem. It follows that it is desirable to design a
system of property rights in such a way as to reduce the need for temporary
trades if possible.
The share entitlement system requires a large number of transactions for
temporary water transfers. For example, the low-ﬂexibility users can either
acquire most entitlements to ensure supply in dry years and sell surplus water
in wet years, or they can hold a lesser number of entitlements and buy allo-
cations in the dry years, or some combination. High-ﬂexibility users would
be on the other side of the market, selling allocations in dry years and buying
in wet years.
By contrast, with the dual system of water entitlements, the low-ﬂexibility
users would acquire the high-security entitlements for most of their needs. High-
ﬂexibility users would acquire lower-security entitlements. There would be little
need for temporary trades to transfer allocations between the two sets of users.
Then, if transaction costs are signiﬁcant, as seems likely for the reasons
noted, the two systems of water property rights will yield different outcomes.
In particular, the system with two water entitlements, distinguished by prior-
ity, requires less trade in variable water allocations and therefore will result in
a more efﬁcient pattern of water allocation in response to variability in water
supplies than the apparently simpler property right system based on a single
share entitlement.Water rights for variable supplies 301
© Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2006
3.2  Finance theory model
The model presented above can be generalised to allow for a set of water
users i = 1 . . . I. We begin by considering the case when there is a ﬁxed aggregate
supply Qw, Qd with Qd < Qw. As was ﬁrst observed by Arrow (1953), the exist-
ence of a complete set of state claims, one for each state, freely tradeable
without transactions costs, guarantees that a competitive market outcome
will be Pareto-optimal. As in the basic model, denote the state-contingent water
prices by Pw, Pd and the demand function for user i by D
i (Pw, Pd) where D:
. We assume that, for all ;,
(4)
That is, at any ﬁxed price ;, aggregate demand in the dry state is at least as
high as in the wet state. It follows that the market-clearing price vector
 for which 
(5)
must satisfy  .
The analysis above can fruitfully be reconsidered using the tools of state-
contingent ﬁnance theory.
We  consider a model with two states of the world as before, with state 1
being the wet state w, and state 2 being the dry state d. As above, we assume
that the (risk-neutral) probability of state w is given by p. Water entitlements
may be viewed as bundles of state-claims (qw, qd) or, to use ﬁnance terminol-
ogy, water securities. Thus, a secure entitlement of one unit of water would be
represented by (1, 1), a low-security entitlement by (1, 0) and a share entitle-
ment by (1, ω) where ω = Qd/Qw is the ratio of aggregate water availability in
state d to aggregate availability in state w. These are the main options under
review in the policy debate.  
A water security structure Σ consists of a set of securities j = 1 . . .  J, each of
which is characterised by a pay-off vector a
j = (qw, qd). We denote by A the
associated J × S pay-off matrix for the securities, with (j, s) entry given by  .
If A is of full rank, there is a 1–1 mapping between security prices, denoted
by V
j for security j with pay-off  , and the implied supporting state-
contingent water prices   satisfy
, (6)
as in the basic model, where p is, as before, the probability of state w. In this
case, the security structure is said to span the state space.
Spanning is a crucial concept in ﬁnance theory. If the security structure
spans the state space, then any possible set of state-contingent pay-offs (in this
case, water allocations) can be constructed as the outcome of a portfolio of marketed
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securities. Hence, in the absence of transactions costs, the market allocation must,
by the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, be Pareto optimal.
The idea is illustrated in Figure 2 (a,b). The span of the securities con-
cerned is given by the shaded area. The darker shaded area represents pay-off
vectors that can be obtained with non-negative holdings of all securities, that
is, without shortselling.
Conversely, and for an arbitrary number of states the state-claim prices can




A portfolio is a vector h ∈ R
J,  where hj is the holding of asset j. Note that,
except where stated otherwise, we allow, hj < 0, that is, short-selling. Given a
water security structure Σ, an entitlement q is in the span of Σ if there exists a
portfolio h such that Ah = q.
Figure 2 Asset spans for four water security structures.
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We ﬁrst consider the following possible security structures: 
Σ
0 consists of a share entitlement (1, ω) only; and
Σ
1 consists of a high-security entitlement (1, 1) and a lower-security entitle-
ment (1, 0).       
These securities are illustrated in Figure 2 (a,b), where the axes represent
quantities contingent on state w and state d. The share entitlement (1, ω) is
marked in Figure 2a, and the entitlements (1, 1) and (1, 0) are marked in Figure
2b. The span Σ
0 is given by the ray through (1, ω). The span of Σ
1, with and
without shortselling is given by the shaded areas.
If shortselling is permitted, Σ
1 spans the state space. More generally,
under the standard assumptions of ﬁnance theory, with two states of nature,
no transactions costs and no restrictions on shortselling, any two linearly
independent securities span the state space. It follows that, under the stated
conditions, Σ
1 spans state space and will permit the achievement of the ﬁrst
best outcome. This gives one reason why the security structure Σ
1, with high-
security and lower-security entitlements, will, in general, be superior to Σ
0.
Unless desired entitlement is proportional to (1, ω), it will not lie within the
span of Σ
0.    
The point may be illustrated further by considering the points marked H
and L, representing the holdings desired by two water-users, one of whom
demands relatively high-security H, with water use in the dry state close to
that in the wet state, while the other is willing to accept lower security, that
is, greater variability. Under Σ
0, each user gets the same level of security,
represented by the ray through (1, ω). By contrast, under Σ
1 the two parties
can trade to achieve the desired outcome.
Consideration of standard ﬁnance models suggests an additional possibility
that may be of interest, at least as a theoretical benchmark. Observing that
the lower-security entitlement is a state-claim for state w, we may wish to
consider the corresponding state-claim for state d, with return (0, 1). This is
a water allocation made available only in the dry state. Such a claim might be
of interest to a farmer or urban water user who relied on rainfall in normal
years, but who wished to supplement rainfall with irrigation water in dry
years (the ‘droughtprooﬁng’ rationale for irrigation). 
Σ
2 consists of a share entitlement (1, ω) and a secure entitlement (1, 1).
Σ
3 consists of state-claims (1, 0) and (0, 1).
Both Σ
2 and Σ
3 span state space, as illustrated in Figure 2 (c,d). Therefore, under
the stated conditions, and with no restrictions on short-selling, the security
structures Σ
2 and Σ
3 will permit the achievement of the ﬁrst best outcome.
In the absence of short-selling, however, irrigators with desired holding L will
not be able to reach this position under Σ
2.
3.3  Temporary trading
Thus far, temporary trades have not been taken into account. A more real-
istic model, closer to the spirit of the informal discussion above, would304 J. Freebairn and J. Quiggin
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begin by excluding short-selling, that is, by restricting attention to portfolios
, with hj ≥ 0, for all j. It would then be necessary to consider temporary
trades as a supplement to holdings of permanent entitlements. In this way,
water users with allocations attached to their entitlements that are in excess
of their desired consumption in a given year can dispose of them using tem-
porary transfers. Since these temporary transfers take the place of short sales,
they are conveniently represented by the negative state claims (−1, 0) and
(0, −1). Thus, the issue of such a negative state claim entitlement corresponds
to a temporary purchase of water.









3 by imposing the restriction that no short selling is
allowed, and adding the temporary transfer entitlements described above. Thus
for example, 9
1 consists of entitlements with payoffs (1, 1), (1, 0), (−1, 0) and
(0, −1). For any given Σ, the expanded entitlement structure 9 consists of J
entitlements for which holdings are restricted to be non-negative and S (neg-
ative) state claims which may be either bought or sold, for a total of J =J + S.
With this setup, market participants can achieve any desired bundle of water
entitlements by trading in the temporary markets. Trade in the temporary
market will not be necessary to achieve a desired entitlement of water q = (qw, qd)




In the absence of transactions costs, the existence of the temporary market
would render permanent entitlements to water redundant. The fact that most
water users prefer permanent entitlements indicates that transactions costs
are signiﬁcant. In addition, a crucial assumption underlying the result above
is that there are no restrictions on short selling. In practice, short selling is
not permitted under current market rules and seems unlikely to develop.
The properties of ﬁnancial market equilibrium with transactions costs and
restrictions on short selling have been examined by a number of writers,
including Pesendorfer (1995), Prisman (1986) and Ross (1987). The analysis
below draws on their work.
We assume that temporary transfers are associated with transaction costs
tw, and td  and that, in terms of initial incidence, transactions costs are borne by
the purchaser of water, that is by the issuer of negative state claims. More
precisely, given a state-claim price vector (pw, pd), the issuer of a state claim
yielding −1 in state s pays (ps + ts)Ps but the purchaser receives only psPs.
Note that, in equilibrium, the incidence of transactions costs will be shared
by buyers and sellers, so that the equilibrium state-claim price vector with
transactions costs (4w, 4d) will not, in general, be equal to the ﬁrst-best equi-
librium vector  .
Thus a comparison between a share entitlement system and a system with
two water entitlements may appear to be biased against the share entitlement
h
J    ∈ + R
h
J    ∈ + R
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system, which does not span the state space. We will show, however that the
arguments set out above will hold even if we consider a combination of shares
and high security entitlements.
We may observe that these entitlements will never be needed if the water
entitlements take the form of state claims, since the ﬁrst best allocation can
always be achieved without short-selling. The arguments presented above
can be formalised to show that transactions costs will always be lower in case
(ii) (a high-security entitlement and a lower-security entitlement) than in case
(i) (a share entitlement and a high security entitlement).
For any water entitlement   let t
i(Q) be the vector of
transactions costs associated with the purchase of Q under security structure
9
i. As an example, consider an individual with access to a share entitlement
and temporary transfers, who wishes to hold the equivalent of a high security
entitlement, so that Qw = Qd. A high security entitlement may be constructed
by purchasing 1/ω units of the share entitlement and [(1/ω) − 1] units of the
negative state claim (−1, 0) (that is, selling the undesired (1/ω) − 1 units of water
in wet states on the temporary transfer market). Relative to the ﬁrst-best, the
associated transaction cost incurred in state w  is  tw[(1/ω) − 1].  No trans-
actions costs are incurred in state d. More generally, we may derive the follow-
ing characterisation of state-contingent transaction costs for any choice of






Since these transactions cost vectors share a common ranking for all Q, we
obtain our main result.





0 (Q) ≥ t
2 (Q) ≥ t
1 (Q) ≥ t
3 (Q) = 0, where the inequality is interpreted
in vector terms. 
Thus, the intuition derived from the graphical model is borne out by a for-
mal analysis. For any given Q, the share entitlement system involves transactions
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costs that are always at least as high as, and sometimes strictly higher than, a
system of high-security and lower-security entitlements. The ﬁrst-best is
obtained under the complete system of contingent state-claims 9
3. Note that,
since Q is endogenous, Theorem 1 does not necessarily imply that greater
transactions costs are necessarily incurred under structure 9
2 than under 9
1.
It may be, for example, that costs are so high as to preclude trade altogether.
More generally, depending on the structure of transactions costs, the volume
of trade may be lower under 9
2 than under 9
1. With the simple setup here,
however, this should not arise. Since the gains from trading away from the
initial allocation are greater under 9
2, there should be more trade and higher
transactions costs under 9
2 than under 9
1.
4. Extensions
It is straightforward to enrich the simple model of Section 3 with a number
of features of practical importance without altering the main conclusions on the
operation of, and the relative merits of, the two sets of options for specifying water
property rights where the variability in water supply availability is important.
4.1 Many users and many states
The two sets of water users in Figure 1 may be extended to include any
number of user types by adding to the number of panels for different user
categories. Further disaggregation of users is warranted when shapes of net
water-demand curves, and especially their elasticities of demand, differ signi-
ﬁcantly between  user categories. Typically, this will require the speciﬁcation
of more than two states of nature.
The model presented above depicts the case of a single river with one dam.
In reality, there may be several tributaries, multiple dams, or even the need to
recognise interdependence of groundwater and surface water supply sources
as part of a water catchment and allocation system.
Consider a water catchment with several tributaries and dams and initially
examine the case of interconnected users where the different users directly or
indirectly can access the different water sources. Arbitrage trading among the
different water users, or at least of marginal users at the end of the water
catchment, will mean a common price for all water allocations in each
period. Such arbitrage opportunities would arise for those periods or states
of water supplies in which the different users in the catchment are able to
draw water from a common pool; or more generally, with a system of multiple
tributaries with their own dams and where main stream water users can draw
on water from each of the dams.
When dams are assigned water entitlements with different degrees of allocation
security, expressions for the expected value of the different entitlements can
be derived as for the earlier models. Then, water entitlements for the different
dams could have different values depending on the probabilities on the quantitiesWater rights for variable supplies 307
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of water allocated per entitlement and on the market water prices associated
with the water allocation in each state.
4.2 Changes in demand
Changes in demand conditions, particularly as they alter the relativities
between the different uses, and changes in the aggregate available supply will be
reﬂected in changes in relative (and absolute) prices of the annual water prices
used to coordinate temporary trades, and then onto changes in the values
of the two property entitlements (via Equations 2 and 3), which co-ordinate
changes in the allocation of permanent water use entitlements. Changes in
the relative prices of water ﬂows and changes in the relative asset prices signal
changes in the relative merits of different water uses. In turn, water is reallo-
cated from the now relatively lower-valued to higher-valued uses.
Compared with the option of a single asset market for water share entitle-
ments, the multiple product option means a thinner market for each product
although there is a high level of substitutability and therefore interdepend-
ence, and some extra market administration and associated higher transaction
costs. Although this is ultimately an empirical question, these potential
downsides seem likely to be small in comparison with the large number of
trades required under the share entitlement system of property rights. Many
of these trades would be avoided under a system with high-security and
lower-security entitlements.
5. Choice of mix of water categories
A simple model with a product transformation frontier and a map of prefer-
ence indifference curves in expected annual allocations of water can be used
to determine the efﬁcient allocation of available water between the high-security
and lower-security water entitlements. The model also shows how changes in
the relative entitlement prices and a market can be used to change the mix of
entitlements over time in response to inevitable but very difﬁcult to predict
changes in future market circumstances.
Figure 3 illustrates the production possibility frontier. On the two axes
are the expected allocation of water per period from each of the two water
entitlements, high security, E(Q
h), and lower security, E(Q
l). The production
possibility frontier is shown as the concave function. It is based on hydrolo-
gical information, and reﬂects the fact that reallocating water from lower-
security to high-security property rights requires additional storage between
seasons. Storage will result in losses of water to evaporation, seepage, and
overﬂow spillages during very wet periods, so the frontier will have a slope
−∞ ≤ [dE(Q
l)/dE(Q
h)] ≤ −1. Aside from these general properties, the particu-
lar position and shape of the production possibility frontier is dam speciﬁc
and will depend on rainfall variability, temperatures, winds, and the ratio of
volume-to-surface area.308 J. Freebairn and J. Quiggin
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Water user preferences for the two types of water entitlements are given by
the convex indifference or iso-value curve, which belongs to a family of preference
curves. Normally, the indifference curve will be strictly convex due to transactions
costs, and because water users are risk averse. In the exceptional case of zero
transaction costs, no risk aversion and no storage losses, the two entitlements
could be regarded as perfect substitutes (per expected unit of water) with a slope 
(9)
Then, for the normal preference curves, the efﬁcient mix of high-security and
lower-security water entitlements will be an internal one, at point E in Figure




Changes in market circumstances will alter the shape of the family of pre-
ference curves. For example, in Figure 3 the indifference curve is shown as
shifting from I to I′ and becoming steeper. The marginal rate of substitution
between the high-security and lower-security water entitlements is likely to
increase with increases in risk aversion, transactions costs, the cost of risk
management strategies, and the relative proﬁtability of the water uses with
inﬂexible demand. Such a change in preferences then would require a reallocation
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of water between high-security and lower-security water entitlements. In Figure 3,
the shift in preferences from I with equilibrium at E, to the preference set
with indifference curve I′, requires a reallocation to F, and an increase in the
relative price of high-security water entitlements.
Given a shift in demand, a proﬁt-maximising water authority will beneﬁt
from the reallocation needed to achieve the shift from E to F, or, more gener-
ally, any equilibrating change in the mix of high-security and lower-security
water entitlements. To illustrate, for the shift from E to F, the water authority
would purchase lower-security entitlements and sell high-security entitlements
at a price ratio given by the marginal rate of technical substitution on the
production possibility function, and noting that this price ratio is bounded
by the relative market equilibrium prices at E and F.
These transactions generate a proﬁt for the water authority. Hence, under
competitive conditions, proﬁt incentives for the water authority and compet-
itive market prices for the different types of water entitlements will facilitate
dynamic efﬁciency reallocations of the mix of high-security and lower-security
entitlements in response to changes in market circumstances facing the different
uses and users of water.
In practice, however, most water authorities are natural monopolies. The
use of market forces to reallocate the mix of types of water entitlements in
response to changing market conditions therefore would require that the procedures
used by the water authority be fully explained, explicit, transparent, and subject
to independent scrutiny.
6. Other institutional issues
This section discusses some institutional options important for the wider
market context in which the special model of the earlier section was devel-
oped. In particular, it considers externalities, water delivery, environmental
ﬂows, and the initial allocation of water property rights. These issues are
beyond the scope of the present paper, but need to be addressed in a more
general consideration of water allocations.
Many of the extractive uses of water involve external costs. Some are largely
of point source pollution form, such as sewage and industrial waste disposal,
and others are of the more difﬁcult to measure non-point source pollution form,
such as chemical residues and downstream salinity from augmentation of the
water table and from run-off water from irrigation. One policy strategy to
internalise these externalities is to impose conditions on water use licenses
(Young and McColl 2002). That is, a licence specifying conditions on water
use may be employed as a targeted instrument for externalities.
Water delivery costs, and any physical restrictions on water delivery, also
can be tied to the water use licence. Alternatively, separate markets for water
delivery access rights might be established. For either option, the relevant
time interval may be as short as a day, compared with the normal market period
for water rights, which is an irrigation season. Economic efﬁciency requires that310 J. Freebairn and J. Quiggin
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the charges and other conditions of water delivery should vary with time, region,
location, capacity utilisation, seepage and evaporation rates, and other factors.
Most extractive uses of water by households, industry, and government
have private-good properties of rival consumption and low costs of exclusion,
and therefore are readily amenable to market allocation. By contrast, many
of the values to society derived from ﬂora, fauna, amenity, and heritage services
produced with water allocated to the environment have public good
properties. Unregulated markets will allocate too little water for environmental
ﬂows (Freebairn 2003).
A ﬁnal issue concerns the initial allocation of property rights for water.
From the perspective of efﬁciency, the Coase theorem indicates that trade
from any initial starting allocation will lead to an efﬁcient allocation in the
long run (Coase 1960). The current reality is that, in most cases, available
water is fully allocated, if not over-allocated, and existing users perceive that
they own the water rights, even though the legal basis for the perception is
fuzzy at best (Goddin 2003). In these circumstances, widely held views on
distributional equity favour a ‘grandfather’ arrangement whereby the new
property rights are allocated to current users.
In cases of over-allocation, or where water is to be reallocated from extrac-
tive uses to environmental ﬂows, reductions in usage could be achieved with-
out violating rights, by government purchase of rights or by specifying the
rights to have a schedule of declining entitlements to water in the future. A
further option would be for governments to purchase reversion rights when
current licenses expire (Quiggin 2006).
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined alternative options for deﬁning property
rights for water where the aggregate availability of water at the dam or source
is variable because of rainfall volatility. One option speciﬁes an entitlement
system based primarily on a share allocation, in which water allocations are
measured as a share of the available supply. The second option has two water
entitlements, a secure right providing a highly reliable supply, and a lower-
security right for the residual water, which has a lower level of reliability. A
third option, considered primarily as an analytical benchmark, is based on
state-contingent claims for water.
Under the special assumptions of zero transaction costs and competi-
tive market behaviour, all systems of water rights for managing variability of
water supply generate identical market outcomes, and these outcomes result
in an efﬁcient allocation of scarce water among different extractive uses.
These results are an instance of the Coase theorem.
In practice, the assumption of zero transaction costs is unreasonable for
the water market. The share entitlement system of property rights requires
more trading of temporary water than will the model based on high-security
and lower-security entitlements. Under a share entitlement system, high-valueWater rights for variable supplies 311
© Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2006
water users with relatively inelastic demands for water are net buyers of water
in dry years, and net sellers in wet years; the opposite is true for users with
relatively elastic demands for water.
By contrast, with high-security and lower-security entitlements, the high-
value and relatively inelastic demand users hold the high-security water entitle-
ments that provide a reliable steady ﬂow of water with little need for purchases
and sales as the available water supply varies. Other users with relatively elastic
demands access water with their lower-security entitlements mainly in wet
years when water is relatively lower priced. The higher transaction costs of
the share model include not only the costs of negotiating and registering tem-
porary water sales and purchases, but also the costs of risk management,
buying and selling delivery rights, and in some cases, obtaining use licenses.
This point has been illustrated using a model of asset valuation in ﬁnancial
markets with transactions costs. The benchmark is a system of property
rights in which there is a complete set of state-contingent claims, which spans
the market without the need to allow short-selling. Hence, under the assump-
tions set out in the model, this system involves zero transactions costs. It is
shown that the alternative systems can be ranked, with the system of high-
security and lower-security rights having strictly lower transactions costs
than a share-entitlement system, even when the latter system is supplemented
by a secure entitlement.
The efﬁcient mix of the high-security water entitlement and the lower-
security entitlement can be determined by equating relative market prices for the
two water rights with the marginal rate of transformation of technical supply
of the two water rights. Further, a proﬁt-maximising water authority has a
socially efﬁcient incentive to change the mix by buying and selling the two
types of water rights in response to changes in market conditions that alter
the relative market prices of the water entitlements.
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